

ANSI/AIAA S-102.0.1-2019

Standard

Capability-based mission assurance program – General requirements

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American National Standard

Capability-based mission assurance program – General requirements

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Abstract

This Standard provides requirements and guidance for implementing a capability-based Mission Assurance Program (MAP), that achieves system safety and mission success requirements through the integrated execution of Safety, RMA (Reliability, Maintainability, Availability, and Testability), and Quality Assurance best practices, which are prescriptively tailored to eliminate or control unacceptable technical risks throughout the system life cycle. The linkage of this Standard to other standards in the family of S-102 capability-based mission assurance standards is described, and an example set of data element descriptions (DEDs) that can be used to manage MAP data transfer and storage between and within organizations, is provided in Annex E.

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Contents

Contents	ii
Foreword	1
Introduction	4
1 Scope	5
2 Applicable Documents	6
2.1 Normative AIAA References	6
2.2 Other References	6
3 Terms, definitions and abbreviated terms.....	7
3.1 Terms and definitions	7
3.2 Abbreviated terms.....	10
4 Objectives, policy and principles — General	12
4.1 Objectives.....	12
4.2 Approach	12
4.3 Essential functions.....	12
5 Detailed requirements.....	16
5.1 Authorize SR&QA program.....	16
5.1.1 Safety Program	16
5.1.2 RMA Programs	16
5.1.3 Quality Assurance Program	17
5.1.4 Assign Qualified Leads, Engineers, and Technicians to SR&QA Program	17
5.1.5 Continuously Improve the SR&QA Processes	18
5.2 Define/Identify, Assess, and Flow Down the SR&QA Requirements.....	18
5.2.1 Flow down of SR&QA Requirements	19
5.2.2 Conflicting SR&QA Requirements Disposition Criteria.....	19
5.3 Planning the SR&QA program	20
5.3.1 Select SR&QA Processes based on Product Unit-value/mission-criticality Categories.....	22
5.3.2 Define SR&QA Process Implementation Phasing Based on System life cycle Phases/Milestones	23
5.3.3 Identify the SR&QA Guidance Sources.....	25
5.3.4 Establish the Technical Performance Metrics	25
5.4 SR&QA Risk Assessment and Control	26
5.4.1 Integrate SR&QA Risk Assessment and Control with Project-wide Closed-loop Technical Risk Management Processes.....	26
5.4.2 SR&QA Risk Management Responsibilities	26
5.4.3 SR&QA Program Self-Inspections	27
5.4.4 SR&QA Risk Identification	28

5.4.5	Qualitative SR&QA Risk Likelihood Assessment.....	30
5.4.6	Quantitative SR&QA Risk Likelihood Assessment	32
5.4.7	SR&QA Risk Mitigation Assessment	32
5.4.8	SR&QA Risk Tracking	33
5.4.9	SR&QA Risk Level Assessment	33
5.4.9.1	High Risk.....	33
5.4.9.2	Medium Risk	34
5.4.9.3	Low Risk.....	34
5.4.10	ESOH/System Safety Risk Management.....	35
5.4.11	Present SR&QA Risk Status Using Standard 5x5 Risk Matrix Format	35
5.4.12	SR&QA Risk Handling/Mitigation.....	38
5.4.13	Perform Structured SR&QA Reviews	38
5.4.14	Apply SR&QA Lessons Learned	39
5.5	Coordinate SR&QA with Other Functions in Product Assurance framework	39
5.5.1	Coordinate Project's and Subcontractor's SR&QA Activities.....	40
5.5.2	Establish, Utilize, and Maintain a Project SR&QA Information System	40
5.6	Apply Engineering and Evaluation Methods to Identify System and Process Deficiencies.....	42
5.6.1	Define the System Failure Criteria and Identify Failure Modes	42
5.6.2	Assess Maturity of Key Input Data, Constraints, Ground Rules, and Analytical Assumptions.....	46
5.7	Verify SR&QA Requirements Are Met	46
ANNEX A - Basic SR&QA Processes.....		A-1
ANNEX B - Capability-based Safety, RMA, and Quality Assurance Program Tailoring Guidance ..		B-1
ANNEX C - Safety, RMA and Quality Assurance (SR&QA) Program and Process Definitions		C-1
C.1 SYSTEM SAFETY PROGRAM.....		C-1
C.2 RELIABILITY, MAINTAINABILITY, AVAILABILITY & TESTABILITY PROGRAM.....		C-7
C.3 QUALITY ASSURANCE (QA) PROGRAM		C-20
ANNEX D - Example Space Safety-critical and Mission-critical Unacceptable Conditions Checklist		D-1
ANNEX E - Example Mission Assurance Program Data Element Descriptions		E-1
Bibliography		F-1

Tables

[Guidance] Table 1. Parable between Essential Functions of SR&QA Program and 7-Step Problem Solving Approach	14
[Guidance] Table 2. Example Product Unit-Value/Mission-Criticality Category Definitions	24
[Guidance] Table 3. Example Space Systems SR&QA Process Capability Level Life Cycle Matrix. ..	25
[Normative] Table 4. Example SR&QA Program Self-Inspection Criteria.	27
[Guidance] Table 5. Example Risk Taxonomy for a Space System Development Project	29

[Guidance] Table 6. Example of Fixed Qualitative Probability Levels for Program Functions	31
[Guidance] Table 7. Example of Fixed Quantitative Probability Levels for Program Domains.....	32
[Guidance] Table 8. Example Failure Mode Severity Categories and Probability Levels	43
[Guidance] Table 9. Example SR&QA Engineering and Evaluation Input Data Maturity Rating Criteria	46

Figures

[Guidance] Figure 1. Example Capability-based SR&QA Program Planning Flow Diagram	13
[Guidance] Figure 2. Example of Systems Engineering Process Flow	15
[Guidance] Figure 3. Example of Systems Engineering Process Life Cycle Implementation.	15
[Guidance] Figure 4. Example Prescribed Tailoring for System Safety Program for Space Systems .	20
[Guidance] Figure 5. Example Prescribed Tailoring for Quality Assurance Program for Space Systems	21
[Guidance] Figure 6. Example Prescribed Tailoring for R&M Program for Space Systems.....	22
[Guidance] Figure 7. Example Closed-Loop Risk Management Process.....	26
[Guidance] Figure 8. Example ISO 17666 compliant 5x5 risk matrix	33
[Guidance] Figure 9. Example ISO 23460 or ISO 14620-1 to ISO 17666 Risk Matrix Translation Matrix	36
[Guidance] Figure 10. ISO 17666 Risk Prioritization Matrix.	37
[Guidance] Figure C-1. Subject Matter Expert Skill Level Classification	C-5
[Guidance] Figure C-2. Example FMEA/FMECA and Critical Item List (CIL) Analysis Process.	C-11
Figure D-1. Space Safety-critical and Mission-critical Unacceptable Conditions	D-1

Foreword

Mission Assurance is an outcome of a combination of properly applied best practices for System Safety, RMA (i.e. Reliability, Maintainability, Availability, and Testability), and Quality Assurance, as opposed to being a separate discipline, process, or design consideration. In addition to Mission Assurance, best practices for Design, Manufacturing, Test, and Operations are also necessary to prompt confidence in the contractor's ability to deliver a system that is operationally safe, reliable, suitable, and effective during mission operations and post-mission disposal operations.

Capability-based Mission Assurance is achieved through prescriptive tailoring of best practices in System Safety, RMA, and Quality Assurance (SR&QA). The primary objective of the Mission Assurance Program (MAP) is to plan and implement a set of SR&QA processes to identify, assess, and eliminate or control unacceptable system safety and mission success risks. These unacceptable risks may be realized at any point in time during the system life cycle, i.e. system definition, preliminary design, critical design, manufacturing, testing, storage, transportation, checkout, mission operations, and post-mission disposal. Note there is no universal list of unacceptable system safety and mission success risks that are applicable to all types of systems. However, similar systems will generally have the same types of unacceptable risks. Note the term *Mission Assurance* and the acronym *SR&QA* are used interchangeably throughout this Standard.

There are five non-normative annexes in this Standard. Annex A lists the forty-one basic Mission Assurance processes. Annex B describes the groups of activities that constitute the five capability levels of each SR&QA process described a MAP. Annex C describes the scope and purpose of each SR&QA process described in the forty-one process-level Mission Assurance standards. The SR&QA processes are grouped technically according to system safety, RMA, and quality assurance programs, and programmatically according to Program Managerial, engineering, and testing functions. The standard system life cycle phases for all systems is shown in Table 3. Annex D provides an example of a systems safety-critical and mission-critical unacceptable conditions checklist. Annex E provides an example library of MAP data element descriptions (DEDs).

Note this Standard defines the “*what to do's*” at the depth necessary to facilitate consistency in planning and implementing a cost-effective SR&QA program. Generally, this Standard is intended to aid users to identify, assess, and mitigate or control SR&QA risks that are commensurate with the product's unit-value/mission-criticality and system life cycle data content/maturity. Specifically, this Standard is intended to be used for the following purposes:

1. To specify a minimum level of capability-based Mission Assurance in a Statement of Work (SOW), Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), or equivalent contractual document;
2. To plan the SR&QA activities needed to achieve a specific level of Capability-based Mission Assurance;
3. To consistently appraise the collective effectiveness of SR&QA activities performed on a system; and
4. To aid any type or size of engineering organization, ranging from one-person micro-companies to multi-division mega-corporations, in verifying that standard technical best practices are applied to the products and services delivered.

For a Capability Level 4 or above MAP, this Standard calls for the use of predefined mission assurance data parameters to facilitate the exchange of MAP data products among computer-aided analysis tools and other project databases.

At the time of approval of this Standard the members of the S-102 Mission Assurance Standards Working Group were:

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- **User** — An authorized representative of a company or organization whose primary activity causes it to use or employ the products, goods, or services that are affected by the standards developed by the particular Committee. A User may also be an organization that represents the health and safety interests of the general public or of specific groups, including workers. A consultant whose primary business involves representing Users is considered to be in the User interest category.

The above consensus body approved this document on 8 Jul 2019.

The AIAA Standards Steering Committee (SSC) accepted this document for publication on 7 Sep 2018.

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Introduction

The terms *System Safety*, *RMAT* and *Quality Assurance* are often used interchangeably, but they have very different meanings. *System Safety* is the acceptable level of risk for conditions, items, or systems that can cause death, injury, occupational illness, damage to or loss of equipment or property, or damage to the environment. *RMAT is Reliability, Maintainability, Availability, and Testability*. *Reliability* is the probability that an item or system will perform a required function without failure under stated conditions for a stated period of time or number of cycles. *Maintainability* is the measure of the ability of an item or system to be retained in or restored to a specified condition. *Availability* is the probability that an item or system will perform as required and when required. *Testability* is the degree to which an item or system supports testing in a given test context. *Quality Assurance* is the part of quality management focused on providing confidence that quality requirements are fulfilled.

The scope and purpose of forty System Safety, RMAT and Quality Assurance (SR&QA) processes are described in Annex C. The SR&QA processes are grouped programmatically according to separate safety, RMAT, and quality assurance domains, and functionally according to documented management, engineering, and testing approaches. Annex B defines the tiered criteria used for rating the SR&QA risk management capability of an existing SR&QA program or for planning the desired SR&QA risk management capability of a new SR&QA program. The unique provisions of this Standard include the following:

- Consistent criteria (see Annex B) for rating the capability of SR&QA program to identify, analyze, and mitigate or control, potential and existing, product and process deficiencies in a manner that is commensurate with the product's unit-value/mission-criticality (see Table 2) and system life cycle data content/maturity (see Table 3);
- Structured planning to achieve a predefined level of SR&QA risk management capability for the overall SR&QA program or any individual SR&QA process, through a statement of work (SOW), memorandum of agreement (MOA), or similar quid pro quo artifact;
- Collecting, reviewing, and applying existing lessons learned for rating the maturity of input data used for performing SR&QA analyses;
- Creating and disseminating new lessons learned to sustain continuous improvement of the SR&QA program throughout the enterprise;

1 Scope

This Standard applies to the design, development, fabrication, test, and operation of commercial, civil, and military systems, sites, facilities, services, devices, and software that are used in ground, nautical, aeronautical, and space missions. Criteria is provided for rating the capability of the entire Safety, RMA, and Quality Assurance (SR&QA) program or an individual SR&QA process, with regard to the identification, assessment, and elimination or control of unacceptable risks that threaten system safety or mission success. The capability rating criteria defined in this Standard identifies the activities needed to achieve a measurable improvement in the effectiveness of SR&QA risk management in stages. Organizations may evaluate their existing SR&QA program against the criteria in this Standard to identify the activities that need to be added, deleted, or modified to achieve the project's acceptable level of technical risk management effort. The phrase "acceptable level of technical risk" means that the activities and resources used to identify, assess, and eliminate or mitigate technical risks are commensurate with the product's unit-value/mission-criticality and system life cycle data content/maturity.

This Standard provides prescribed-tailoring of SR&QA programs that are capable of achieving the following objectives concurrently: (1) successful completion of project milestones; (2) effective mitigation of technical risks (i.e. optimally eliminating, reducing, controlling, transferring, avoiding, accepting, and monitoring risks); and (3) efficient improvement of the technical risk assessment process. See Figure C-1 for a notional view of this concept.