

American Nuclear Society

REAFFIRMED

**December 8, 2006
ANSI/ANS-8.22-1997
(R2006)**

**nuclear criticality safety based on
limiting and controlling moderators**


an American National Standard

REAFFIRMED

**November 11, 2011
ANSI/ANS-8.22-1997
(R2011)**

This standard has been reviewed and reaffirmed with the recognition that it may reference other standards and documents that may have been superseded or withdrawn. The requirements of this document will be met by using the version of the standards and documents referenced herein. It is the responsibility of the user to review each of the references and to determine whether the use of the original references or more recent versions is appropriate for the facility. Variations from the standards and documents referenced in this standard should be evaluated and documented. This standard does not necessarily reflect recent industry initiatives for risk informed decision-making or a graded approach to quality assurance. Users should consider the use of these industry initiatives in the application of this standard.

ANSI/ANS-8.22-1997



published by the
American Nuclear Society
555 North Kensington Avenue
La Grange Park, Illinois 60525 USA

ANSI/ANS-8.22-1997

**American National Standard
for Nuclear Criticality Safety Based on
Limiting and Controlling Moderators**

Secretariat
American Nuclear Society

Prepared by the
**American Nuclear Society
Standards Committee
Working Group ANS-8.22**

Published by the
**American Nuclear Society
555 North Kensington Avenue
La Grange Park, Illinois 60526 USA**

Approved October 31, 1997
by the
American National Standards Institute, Inc.

American National Standard

Designation of this document as an American National Standard attests that the principles of openness and due process have been followed in the approval procedure and that a consensus of those directly and materially affected by the standard has been achieved.

This standard was developed under procedures of the Standards Committee of the American Nuclear Society; these procedures are accredited by the American National Standards Institute, Inc., as meeting the criteria for American National Standards. The consensus committee that approved the standard was balanced to ensure that competent, concerned, and varied interests have had an opportunity to participate.

An American National Standard is intended to aid industry, consumers, governmental agencies, and general interest groups. Its use is entirely voluntary. The existence of an American National Standard, in and of itself, does not preclude anyone from manufacturing, marketing, purchasing, or using products, processes, or procedures not conforming to the standard.

By publication of this standard, the American Nuclear Society does not insure anyone utilizing the standard against liability allegedly arising from or after its use. The content of this standard reflects acceptable practice at the time of its approval and publication. Changes, if any, occurring through developments in the state of the art, may be considered at the time that the standard is subjected to periodic review. It may be reaffirmed, revised, or withdrawn at any time in accordance with established procedures. Users of this standard are cautioned to determine the validity of copies in their possession and to establish that they are of the latest issue.

The American Nuclear Society accepts no responsibility for interpretations of this standard made by any individual or by any ad hoc group of individuals. Requests for interpretation should be sent to the Standards Department at Society Headquarters. Action will be taken to provide appropriate response in accordance with established procedures that ensure consensus on the interpretation.

Comments on this standard are encouraged and should be sent to Society Headquarters.

Published by

**American Nuclear Society
555 North Kensington Avenue
La Grange Park, Illinois 60526 USA**

Copyright © 1997 by American Nuclear Society. All rights reserved.

Any part of this standard may be quoted. Credit lines should read "Extracted from American National Standard ANSI/ANS-8.22-1997 with permission of the publisher, the American Nuclear Society." Reproduction prohibited under copyright convention unless written permission is granted by the American Nuclear Society.

Printed in the United States of America

Foreword (This Foreword is not a part of American National Standard for Nuclear Criticality Safety Based on Limiting and Controlling Moderators, ANSI/ANS-8.22-1997.)

This standard has been in the draft stage for more than two decades with several different chairmen and several different working groups. The continuing effort over many years illustrates the consistent desire for a standard for moderation control. Diversity in the individuals in the working group and diversity in the organizations that the individuals represent have made this standard a tool that can be used throughout the complex. The interest in this standard is consistently demonstrated by the large attendance at the working group meetings and by the large membership of the current Working Group ANS-8.22. Many ideas have been brought before the working group ranging from publication of definitive limits to a standard for general guidance specific to limiting and controlling moderators.

This new standard was prepared by Working Group ANS-8.22 of Subcommittee 8 of the Standards Committee of the American Nuclear Society. This working group was composed of:

J. S. Bullington, *Chairman, Westinghouse Safety Management Solutions*
J. J. Bazley, *Parallax, Inc.*
G. H. Bidinger, *Individual*
C. L. Brown, *Individual*
W. E. Cox, *Individual*
M. J. Crouse, *Westinghouse Safety Management Solutions*
L. C. Davenport, *Individual*
E. P. Elliot, *Individual*
I. E. Fergus, *U.S. Department of Energy*
A. L. Hess, *Westinghouse Hanford Company*
J. E. Hicks, *Safe Sites of Colorado, LLC.*
B. O. Kidd, *Babcock & Wilcox Company*
B. J. Klotz, *Individual*
C. D. Manning, *Siemens Power Corporation*
R. C. McBroom, *U.S. Department of Energy*
R. D. Montgomery, *Westinghouse Commercial Nuclear Fuels Division*
R. L. Oxenham, *Individual*
T. A. Reilly, *Westinghouse Safety Management Solutions*
C. A. Rogers, *Westinghouse Hanford Company*
B. M. Rothleder, *U.S. Department of Energy*
R. E. Rothe, *Individual*
R. V. Stachowiak, *Kaiser Hill Company, LLC.*
J. E. Tanner, *Individual*
R. A. Williams, *Westinghouse Commercial Nuclear Fuels Division*

Working Group ANS-8.22 specifically recognizes R. L. Oxenham for his efforts in preparation of this standard. This standard is dedicated in his memory.

The Membership of Subcommittee ANS-8 at the time of this standard's initial vote was:

T. P. McLaughlin, Chairman, *Los Alamos National Laboratory*
J. A. Schlessor, Secretary, *Los Alamos National Laboratory*
F. M. Alcorn, *Babcock & Wilcox Company*
R. D. Carter, *Mohr & Associates*
E. D. Clayton, *Individual*
D. M. Dawson, *E. R. Johnson, Assoc., Inc.*
D. R. Finch, *Westinghouse Savannah River Company*
A. S. Garcia, *Argonne National Laboratory*
C. M. Hopper, *Oak Ridge National Laboratory*
E. B. Johnson, *Oak Ridge National Laboratory*
N. Ketzlach, *Individual*
R. Kiyose, *Tokai University*
R. A. Libby, *BPNWL*
W. G. Morrison, *Individual*
D. A. Reed, *Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc.*
D. R. Smith, *Individual*
J. T. Thomas, *Individual*
H. Toffer, *Safe Sites of Colorado, LLC.*
G. E. Whitesides, *Individual*

Consensus Committee N16, Nuclear Criticality Safety, had the following membership at the time of its approval of this standard:

D. R. Smith, Chairman
R. A. Knief, Vice-Chairman

G. H. Bidinger Individual
R. D. Busch University of New Mexico
S. P. Congdon GE Nuclear Energy
H. L. Dodds, Jr. University of Tennessee
R. A. Knief Ogden Environmental and Energy Services
J. R. LaRiviere American Institute of Chemical Engineers
C. D. Manning Siemens Nuclear Power Corporation
S. P. Murray Health Physics Society
H. C. Paxton Individual
R. L. Reed Westinghouse Savannah River Company
B. M. Rothleder U.S. Department of Energy
F. W. Sanders Individual
D. R. Smith American Nuclear Society
R. G. Taylor Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, Inc.
J. T. Thomas Individual
R. M. Westfall Lockheed Martin Energy Research Corporation

Contents	Section	Page
	1. Introduction	1
	2. Scope	1
	3. Definitions	1
	3.1 Limitations	1
	3.2 Shall, Should, and May	1
	3.3 Glossary of Terms	1
	4. Nuclear Criticality Safety Practices	1
	4.1 Administrative Practices for Limitation and Control of Moderators	1
	4.2 Process Evaluation for Limitation And Control of Moderators	2
	5. Engineered Practices for Moderator Control Areas	2
	5.1 Moderator Control Area Barriers	2
	5.2 Equipment and Containers	3
	5.3 Penetrations	3
	5.4 Fire Prevention and Suppression	3
	5.5 Instrumentation and Controls	3
	6. References	3
	Appendices	
	Appendix A Typical Moderating Materials	4
	Appendix B Potential Sources of Moderators	5
	Appendix C Moderator Content Measurements	7
	Appendix D Examples of Engineered Barriers To Control Moderators	8

This is a preview of "ANSI/ANS-8.22-1997 (...". [Click here to purchase the full version from the ANSI store.](#)



Nuclear Criticality Safety Based on Limiting and Controlling Moderators

1. Introduction

Guidance for the prevention of criticality accidents in the handling, storing, processing, and transporting of fissionable materials is presented in American National Standard for Nuclear Criticality Safety in Operations with Fissionable Materials Outside Reactors, ANSI/ANS-8.1-1983 (R1988) [1]¹.

For many operations, criticality safety is achieved through the limitation of parameters such as geometry, mass, enrichment, and spacing of fissile materials. The amount of fissile material that can be safely handled, stored, or processed at one time can also depend on the credible range of neutron moderation. Optimum moderation, by definition, results in the lowest critical mass of fissile materials, other conditions being unchanged. An allowable mass significantly greater than the allowable mass at optimum moderation can be justified by limitation and control of moderators, i.e., control of moderators within specified limits.

This standard provides guidance for criticality safety by the limitation and control of moderators in the range from no moderation to optimum moderation for fissile materials.

2. Scope

This standard applies to limiting and controlling moderators to achieve criticality safety in operations with fissile materials in a moderator control area. This standard does not apply to concentration control of fissile materials.

3. Definitions

3.1 Limitations. The definitions given in this standard are of a restricted nature for the purposes of this standard. Other specialized terms are defined in the American Nuclear Society publication *Glossary of Terms in Nuclear Science and Technology* [2].

3.2 Shall, Should, and May. The word "shall" is used to denote a requirement; the word

"should" to denote a recommendation; and the word "may" to denote permission, neither a requirement nor a recommendation.

3.3 Glossary of Terms

moderation. The process of decreasing the energy of neutrons through successive collisions with moderator nuclei without appreciable competing capture.

moderator. A material that reduces neutron energy by scattering without appreciable capture. Materials of prime concern are those containing light nuclei with large scattering cross sections and relatively low absorption cross sections.²

moderator control area. An area defined by the process evaluation in which moderators are limited and controlled for nuclear criticality safety.

moderator control engineered barrier. A physical feature of a system specifically identified and used to limit or control the introduction of moderators for nuclear criticality safety.³

process evaluation. A document that identifies and defines all known criticality safety concerns; documents criticality safety assumptions, requirements, limits, and controls; and demonstrates subcriticality. The process evaluation is often referred to as a Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation (NCSE).

4. Nuclear Criticality Safety Practices

4.1 Administrative Practices for Limitation and Control of Moderators

4.1.1. Written procedures shall include the nuclear criticality safety limits and controls for operation. These procedures should address any steps to be taken if a moderator control fails.

² Examples of typical moderators are provided in Appendix A.

³ Examples of typical moderator control engineered barriers are provided in Appendix D.

¹ Numbers in brackets refer to corresponding numbers in Section 6, References.