



American National Standard
for Financial Services

ANS X9.24-1:2009

Retail Financial Services
Symmetric Key Management
Part 1: Using Symmetric Techniques



Secretariat

Accredited Standards Committee X9, Inc.

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Introduction

Today, billions of dollars in funds are transferred electronically by various communication methods. Transactions are often entered remotely, off-premise from financial institutions, by retailers or by customers directly. Such transactions are transmitted over potentially non-secure media. The vast range in value, size, and the volume of such transactions expose institutions to severe risks, which may be uninsurable.

To protect these financial messages and other sensitive information, many institutions are making increased use of the American National Standards Institute Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA). Specific examples of its use include standards for message authentication, personal identification number encryption, other data encryption, and key encryption.

The TDEA is in the public domain. The security and reliability of any process based on the TDEA is directly dependent on the protection afforded to secret numbers called cryptographic keys. This part of this standard deals exclusively with management of symmetric keys using symmetric techniques. ANS X9.24-2 addresses management of symmetric keys using asymmetric techniques.

A familiar analogy may be found in the combination lock of a vault. The lock design is public knowledge. Security is provided by keeping a number, the combination, a secret. Secure operation also depends on protective procedures and features which prevent surreptitious viewing or determination of the combination by listening to its operation. Procedures are also required to ensure that the combination is random and cannot be modified by an unauthorized individual without detection.

Suggestions for the improvement of this standard will be welcome. They should be sent to the ASC X9 Secretariat, Accredited Standards Committee X9, Inc., 1212 West Street, Suite 200, Annapolis, MD 21401.

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Retail Financial Services Symmetric Key Management Part 1: Using Symmetric Techniques

1 Purpose

This key management standard, utilized in conjunction with the American National Standard Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) (see Reference 2), is used to manage symmetric keys that can be used to protect messages and other sensitive information in a financial services environment. The security and reliability of any process based on the TDEA is directly dependent on the protection afforded to secret parameters called cryptographic keys.

This standard establishes requirements and guidelines for the secure management and application-level interoperability of keying operations. Such keys could be used for authenticating messages (see Reference 5), for encrypting Personal Identification Numbers (PIN) (see Reference 4), for encrypting other data, and for encrypting other keys.

2 Scope

This part of this standard covers both the manual and automated management of keying material used for financial services such as point-of-sale (POS) transactions (debit and credit), automated teller machine (ATM) transactions, messages among terminals and financial institutions, and interchange messages among acquirers, switches and card issuers. This part of this standard deals exclusively with management of symmetric keys using symmetric techniques. This part of this standard specifies the minimum requirements for the management of keying material. Addressed are all components of the key management life cycle including generation, distribution, utilization, storage, archiving, replacement and destruction of the keying material. An institution's key management process, whether implemented in a computer or a terminal, is not to be implemented or controlled in a manner that has less security, protection, or control than described herein. It is intended that two nodes, if they implement compatible versions of:

- the same secure key management method,
- the same secure key identification technique approved for a particular method, and
- the same key separation methodologies

in accordance with this part of this standard will be interoperable at the application level. Other characteristics may be necessary for node interoperability; however, this part of this standard does not cover such characteristics as message format, communications protocol, transmission speed, or device interface.

2.1 Application

This part of this standard is applicable for institutions implementing techniques to safeguard cryptographic keys used for authentication and encryption of messages and other sensitive data. Specifically, this applies to institutions in the financial services industry implementing References 4 and/or 5.