



American National Standard for Financial Services

ANS X9.24 Part 2: 2016

Retail Financial Services Symmetric Key Management Part 2: Using Asymmetric Techniques for the Distribution of Symmetric Keys



Secretariat

Accredited Standards Committee X9, Incorporated

Financial Industry Standards

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Introduction

Today, billions of dollars in funds are transferred electronically by various communication methods. Transactions are often entered remotely, off-premise from financial institutions, by retailers or by customers directly. Such transactions are transmitted over potentially non-secure media. The vast range in value, size, and the volume of such transactions expose institutions to severe risks, which may be uninsurable.

To protect these financial messages and other sensitive information, many institutions are making use of the American National Standards Institute Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA), or the algorithm defined in the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Specific examples of TDEA use include standards for message authentication, personal identification number encryption, other data encryption, and key encryption.

The TDEA and AES are in the public domain. The security and reliability of any process based on these algorithms is directly dependent on the protection afforded to secret numbers called cryptographic keys.

A familiar analogy may be found in the combination lock of a vault. The lock design is public knowledge. Security is provided by keeping a number, the combination, a secret. Secure operation also depends on protective procedures and features which prevent surreptitious viewing or determination of the combination by listening to its operation. Procedures are also required to ensure that the combination is random and cannot be modified by an unauthorized individual without detection.

Part 1 of ANS X9.24 deals exclusively with management of symmetric keys using symmetric techniques. This Part 2 addresses the use of asymmetric techniques for the distribution of symmetric keys. Asymmetric techniques utilize algorithms other than the DEA (e.g., Diffie-Hellman, RSA, Elliptic Curve, etc.). Those asymmetric algorithms are defined in other American National Standards Institute standards (e.g., ANS X9.42 Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: Agreement of Symmetric Algorithm Keys Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, ANS X9.44 DRAFT Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: Key Agreement and Key Transport Using Factoring-Based Cryptography, and X9.63 Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: Key Agreement and Key Management Using Elliptic Curve-Based Cryptography). Those algorithms are also in the public domain, and the security and reliability are also dependent on the security and integrity of the asymmetric keys and the infrastructure under which those keys are created and managed.

This part of ANS X9.24 assumes the reader is familiar with the concepts behind asymmetric cryptography.

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Retail Financial Services Symmetric Key Management Part 2: Using Asymmetric Techniques for the Distribution of Symmetric Keys

1 Purpose

The financial services industry desires an additional and cost effective method of implementing symmetric key distribution at remote devices and between communicating pairs. Compliant implementation of the requirements stated in ANS X9.24 Part 1 for the secure management of symmetric keys requires (among other things) unique keys per device and strict enforcement of dual control and split knowledge processes for handling the full-length (i.e., not concatenated) keying material deployed to remote devices or established between communicating pairs. Historically, *compliant* implementation of key distribution has been a manually performed, physically on-site process that is difficult to manage, costly, and/or non-existent (i.e., not compliant). An automated rather than manual method of distributing symmetric keys could address these issues and could result in improved security of the financial services networked environment.

The use of public key cryptography and associated asymmetric key algorithms is one proposed solution for automated remote symmetric key distribution. Unlike clear symmetric keys which are to be protected from disclosure at all times during their key life cycle, the clear public keys of the asymmetric key pairs may be exchanged over open networks. This characteristic allows for automated distribution from a remote location and may eliminate the above issues associated with manual key loading. Once distributed, the protocols associated with the asymmetric algorithms may be used to establish the symmetric key, and may eliminate the manual symmetric key loading process and its associated risks. There are two such protocols for establishing the symmetric key. The key transport protocol may be used by the sender to encrypt and transport the symmetric key to the receiver. The key agreement protocol may be used to mutually derive the symmetric key.

The security and reliability of any process based on public key algorithms is directly dependent on the protection afforded to the secrecy of each key pair's associated private key and the integrity of the key pair and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) environment under which those key pairs are created and managed. Key modulus sizes and the underlying mathematics of the asymmetric key algorithms should also be considered as factors in the overall security of the implementation. The public key validation is a very important security aspect. Implementation of the system includes measures to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks on the system, and ensure the mutual authentication of the sender and receiver of the keys.

This part of ANS X9.24 establishes requirements and guidelines for the secure management and application-level interoperability of such automated keying operations. This part of this standard addresses symmetric keys managed with asymmetric keys, and asymmetric keys managed with symmetric keys (as in the storage of private keys encrypted with a symmetric master key for storage as cryptograms on a local database). This part of ANS X9.24 does NOT address using asymmetric keys to encrypt the Personal Identification Number (PIN) and does NOT address asymmetric keys managed with asymmetric keys.

2 Scope

This part of ANS X9.24 covers the establishment of device initial trust and management of keying material used for financial services such as point of sale (POS) transactions, automatic teller machine (ATM) transactions, messages among terminals and financial institutions, and interchange messages among acquirers, switches and