



American National Standard  
for Financial Services

X9.92-1-2009

Public Key Cryptography for the Financial  
Services Industry

Digital Signature Algorithms Giving Partial  
Message Recovery

Part 1: Elliptic Curve Pintsov-Vanstone  
Signatures (ECPVS)



Accredited Standards Committee X9, Incorporated  
Financial Industry Standards

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## **ANS X9.92-1-2009**

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## **Introduction**

Business practice has changed with the introduction of computer-based technologies. The substitution of electronic transactions for their paper-based predecessors has reduced costs and improved efficiency. Trillions of dollars in funds and securities are transferred daily by telephone, wire services, and other electronic communication mechanisms. The high value or sheer volume of such transactions within an open environment exposes the financial community and its customers to potentially severe risks from the accidental or deliberate disclosure, alteration, substitution, or destruction of data. These risks are compounded by interconnected networks, and the increased number and sophistication of malicious adversaries. Electronically communicated data may be secured through the use of symmetrically keyed encryption algorithms (e.g. ANS X9.52, Triple-DEA) in combination with public-key cryptography-based key management techniques.

Some of the conventional "due care" controls used with paper-based transactions are unavailable in electronic transactions. Examples of such controls are safety paper which protects integrity, and handwritten signatures or embossed seals which indicate the intent of the originator to be legally bound. In an electronic-based environment, controls must be in place that provide the same degree of assurance and certainty as in a paper environment. The financial community is responding to these needs.

This Standard, X9.92-1-2009, Public Key Cryptography For The Financial Services Industry: Digital Signatures Algorithms Giving Partial Message Recovery: Elliptic Curve Pintsov-Vanstone Signatures (ECPVS), defines a mechanism designed to facilitate the secure authentication and non-repudiation of data.

While the techniques specified in this Standard are designed to facilitate authentication and non-repudiation applications, the Standard does not guarantee that a particular implementation is secure. It is the responsibility of the financial institution to put an overall process in place with the necessary controls to ensure that the process is securely implemented. Furthermore, the controls should include the application of appropriate audit tests in order to verify compliance.

**NOTE** The user's attention is called to the possibility that compliance with this Standard may require the use of an invention covered by patent rights. By publication of this Standard, no position is taken with respect to the validity of this claim or of any patent rights in connection therewith. The patent holder has, however, filed a statement of willingness to grant a license under these rights on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms and conditions to applicants desiring to obtain such a license. Details may be obtained from the standards developer

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# Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry Digital Signature Algorithms Giving Partial Message Recovery Part 1: Elliptic Curve Pintsov-Vanstone Signatures (ECPVS)

## 1 Scope

This Standard defines methods for digital signature generation and verification for the protection of messages and data giving partial message recovery.

This document is Part 1 of this Standard, and it defines the Elliptic Curve Pintsov-Vanstone Signature (ECPVS) digital signature algorithm. Part 2 of this Standard defines the Finite Field Pintsov-Vanstone Signature (FFPVS) digital signature algorithm.

ECPVS is a signature scheme with low message expansion (overhead) and variable length recoverable and visible message parts. ECPVS is ideally suited for short messages, yet is flexible enough to handle messages of any length.

The ECPVS shall be used in conjunction with an Approved hash function and an Approved symmetric encryption scheme. In addition, this ECPVS Standard provides the criteria for checking the message redundancy.

Supporting examples are also provided.

## 2 Conformance

An implementation of elliptic curve Pintsov-Vanstone signatures may claim conformance with this Standard if it implements the mandatory provisions in Part 1.

## 3 Normative references

The following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. Nevertheless, parties to agreements based on this document are encouraged to consider applying the most recent edition of the referenced documents indicated below. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

ANS X9.52, *Triple Data Encryption Algorithm Modes of Operation*

ANS X9.62, *Public-Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)*

ANS X9.63, *Public-Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: Key Agreement and Key Transport Using Elliptic Curve Cryptography*

ASC X9 Registry Item 00002, Advanced Encryption Standard

ASC X9 Registry Item 00003, Secure Hash Standard