National foreword

This British Standard is the UK implementation of EN IEC 62645:2020. It is identical to IEC 62645:2019. It supersedes BS IEC 62645:2019, which is withdrawn.

The UK participation in its preparation was entrusted to Technical Committee NCE/8, Instrumentation, Control & Electrical Systems of Nuclear Facilities.

A list of organizations represented on this committee can be obtained on request to its committee manager.

This publication does not purport to include all the necessary provisions of a contract. Users are responsible for its correct application.

© The British Standards Institution 2020
Published by BSI Standards Limited 2020

ISBN 978 0 539 15055 1

ICS 27.120.20

Compliance with a British Standard cannot confer immunity from legal obligations.

This British Standard was published under the authority of the Standards Policy and Strategy Committee on 30 November 2019.

Amendments/corrigenda issued since publication

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<td>31 August 2020</td>
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Nuclear power plants - Instrumentation, control and electrical power systems - Cybersecurity requirements (IEC 62645:2019)
European foreword

The text of document 45A/1289/FDIS, future edition 2 of IEC 62645, prepared by SC 45A "Instrumentation, control and electrical power systems of nuclear facilities" of IEC/TC 45 "Nuclear instrumentation" was submitted to the IEC-CENELEC parallel vote and approved by CENELEC as EN IEC 62645:2020.

The following dates are fixed:

- latest date by which the document has to be implemented at national level by publication of an identical national standard or by endorsement (dop) 2021-07-07
- latest date by which the national standards conflicting with the document have to be withdrawn (dow) 2023-07-07

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As stated in the nuclear safety directive 2009/71/EURATOM, Chapter 1, Article 2, item 2, Member States are not prevented from taking more stringent safety measures in the subject-matter covered by the Directive, in compliance with Community law.

In a similar manner, this European standard does not prevent Member States from taking more stringent nuclear safety and/or security measures in the subject-matter covered by this standard.

Endorsement notice

The text of the International Standard IEC 62645:2019 was approved by CENELEC as a European Standard without any modification.

In the official version, for Bibliography, the following notes have to be added for the standards indicated:

IEC 60709 NOTE Harmonized as EN IEC 60709
Normative references to international publications with their corresponding European publications

The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their content constitutes requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

NOTE 1 Where an International Publication has been modified by common modifications, indicated by (mod), the relevant EN/HD applies.

NOTE 2 Up-to-date information on the latest versions of the European Standards listed in this annex is available here: www.cenelec.eu.

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NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS – INSTRUMENTATION, CONTROL AND ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS – CYBERSECURITY REQUIREMENTS

FOREWORD

1) The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) is a worldwide organization for standardization comprising all national electrotechnical committees (IEC National Committees). The object of IEC is to promote international co-operation on all questions concerning standardization in the electrical and electronic fields. To this end and in addition to other activities, IEC publishes International Standards, Technical Specifications, Technical Reports, Publicly Available Specifications (PAS) and Guides (hereafter referred to as “IEC Publication(s)”). Their preparation is entrusted to technical committees; any IEC National Committee interested in the subject dealt with may participate in this preparatory work. International, governmental and non-governmental organizations liaising with the IEC also participate in this preparation. IEC collaborates closely with the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) in accordance with conditions determined by agreement between the two organizations.

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9) Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this IEC Publication may be the subject of patent rights. IEC shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.

International Standard IEC 62645 has been prepared by subcommittee 45A: Instrumentation, control and electrical power systems of nuclear facilities, of IEC technical committee 45: Nuclear instrumentation.

This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition published in 2014. This edition constitutes a technical revision.

This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:

a) to align the standard with the new revisions of ISO/IEC 27001;

b) to review the existing requirements and to update the terminology and definitions;

c) to take account of, as far as possible, requirements associated with standards published since the first edition;

d) to take into account the fact that cybersecurity techniques, but also national practices evolve.
The text of this International Standard is based on the following documents:

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Full information on the voting for the approval of this International Standard can be found in the report on voting indicated in the above table.

This document has been drafted in accordance with the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.

The committee has decided that the contents of this document will remain unchanged until the stability date indicated on the IEC website under “http://webstore.iec.ch” in the data related to the specific document. At this date, the document will be

- reconfirmed,
- withdrawn,
- replaced by a revised edition, or
- amended.

IMPORTANT – The 'colour inside' logo on the cover page of this publication indicates that it contains colours which are considered to be useful for the correct understanding of its contents. Users should therefore print this document using a colour printer.
INTRODUCTION

a) Technical background, main issues and organisation of the standard

This International Standard focuses on the issue of cybersecurity requirements to prevent and/or minimize the impact of attacks against I&C programmable digital systems on nuclear safety and plant performance. It covers programme level, architectural level and system level requirements.

This standard was prepared and based on the ISO/IEC 27000 series, IAEA and country specific guidance in this expanding technical and security focus area.

It is intended that the International Standard be used by designers and operators of nuclear power plants (NPPs) (utilities), licensees, systems evaluators, vendors and subcontractors, and by licensors.

b) Situation of the current Standard in the structure of the IEC SC 45A standard series

IEC 62645 is a second level IEC SC 45A document, tackling the generic issue of NPP I&C cybersecurity.

IEC 62645 is considered formally as a second level document with respect to IEC 61513, although IEC 61513 needs revision to actually ensure proper reference to and consistency with IEC 62645. IEC 62645 is the top-level document with respect to cybersecurity in the SC 45A standard series. Other documents are developed under IEC 62645 and correspond to third level documents in the IEC SC 45A standards.

For more details on the structure of the IEC SC 45A standard series, see item d) of this introduction.

c) Recommendations and limitations regarding the application of this standard

This standard establishes requirements for I&C programmable digital systems, with regard to computer security, and clarifies the processes that I&C programmable digital systems are designed, developed and operated under in NPPs.

It is recognized that this standard addresses an evolving area of regulatory requirements, due to the changing and evolving nature of computer security threats. Therefore, the standard defines a framework within which the evolving country specific requirements may be developed and applied.

It is also recognized that products derived from application of this subject matter require protection. Release of the standard’s country specific requirements should be controlled to limit the extent to which organizations or individuals intending to access nuclear plant systems illegally, improperly or without authorization may benefit from this information.

d) Description of the structure of the IEC SC 45A standard series and relationships with other IEC documents and other bodies documents (IAEA, ISO)

The top-level documents of the IEC SC 45A standard series are IEC 61513 and IEC 63046. IEC 61513 provides general requirements for I&C systems and equipment that are used to perform functions important to safety in NPPs. IEC 63046 provides general requirements for electrical power systems of NPPs; it covers power supply systems including the supply systems of the I&C systems. IEC 61513 and IEC 63046 are to be considered in conjunction and at the same level. IEC 61513 and IEC 63046 structure the IEC SC 45A standard series
and shape a complete framework establishing general requirements for instrumentation, control and electrical systems for nuclear power plants.

IEC 61513 and IEC 63046 refer directly to other IEC SC 45A standards for general topics related to categorization of functions and classification of systems, qualification, separation, defence against common cause failure, control room design, electromagnetic compatibility, cybersecurity, software and hardware aspects for programmable digital systems, coordination of safety and security requirements and management of ageing. The standards referenced directly at this second level should be considered together with IEC 61513 and IEC 63046 as a consistent document set.

At a third level, IEC SC 45A standards not directly referenced by IEC 61513 or by IEC 63046 are standards related to specific equipment, technical methods, or specific activities. Usually these documents, which make reference to second-level documents for general topics, can be used on their own.

A fourth level extending the IEC SC 45 standard series, corresponds to the Technical Reports which are not normative.

The IEC SC 45A standards series consistently implement and detail the safety and security principles and basic aspects provided in the relevant IAEA safety standards and in the relevant documents of the IAEA nuclear security series (NSS). In particular this includes the IAEA requirements SSR-2/1, establishing safety requirements related to the design of nuclear power plants (NPPs), the IAEA safety guide SSG-30 dealing with the safety classification of structures, systems and components in NPPs, the IAEA safety guide SSG-39 dealing with the design of instrumentation and control systems for NPPs, the IAEA safety guide SSG-34 dealing with the design of electrical power systems for NPPs and the implementing guide NSS17 for computer security at nuclear facilities. The safety and security terminology and definitions used by SC 45A standards are consistent with those used by the IAEA.

IEC 61513 and IEC 63046 have adopted a presentation format similar to the basic safety publication IEC 61508 with an overall life-cycle framework and a system life-cycle framework. Regarding nuclear safety, IEC 61513 and IEC 63046 provide the interpretation of the general requirements of IEC 61508-1, IEC 61508-2 and IEC 61508-4, for the nuclear application sector. In this framework IEC 60880, IEC 62138 and IEC 62566 correspond to IEC 61508-3 for the nuclear application sector. IEC 61513 and IEC 63046 refer to ISO as well as to IAEA GS-R part 2 and IAEA GS-G-3.1 and IAEA GS-G-3.5 for topics related to quality assurance (QA). At level 2, regarding nuclear security, IEC 62645 is the entry document for the IEC/SC 45A security standards. It builds upon the valid high level principles and main concepts of the generic security standards, in particular ISO/IEC 27001 and ISO/IEC 27002; it adapts them and completes them to fit the nuclear context and coordinates with the IEC 62443 series. At level 2, IEC 60964 is the entry document for the IEC/SC 45A control rooms standards and IEC 62342 is the entry document for the ageing management standards.

NOTE 1 It is assumed that for the design of I&C systems in NPPs that implement conventional safety functions (e.g. to address worker safety, asset protection, chemical hazards, process energy hazards) international or national standards would be applied.

NOTE 2 IEC/SC 45A domain was extended in 2013 to cover electrical systems. In 2014 and 2015 discussions were held within IEC/SC 45A to decide how and where general requirements for the design of electrical systems were to be considered. IEC/SC 45A experts recommended that an independent standard be developed at the same level as IEC 61513 to establish general requirements for electrical systems. Project IEC 63046 is now launched to cover this objective. When IEC 63046 is published, this Note 2 of the introduction of IEC/SC 45A standards will be suppressed.
1 Scope

1.1 General

This document establishes requirements and provides guidance for the development and management of effective computer security programmes for I&C programmable digital systems. Inherent to these requirements and guidance is the criterion that the power plant I&C programmable digital system security programme complies with the applicable country's requirements.

This document defines adequate measures for the prevention of, detection of and reaction to malicious acts by digital means (cyberattacks) on I&C programmable digital systems. This includes any unsafe situation, equipment damage or plant performance degradation that could result from such an act, such as:

- malicious modifications affecting system integrity;
- malicious interference with information, data or resources that could compromise the delivery of or performance of the required I&C programmable digital functions;
- malicious interference with information, data or resources that could compromise operator displays or lead to loss of management of I&C programmable digital systems;
- malicious changes to hardware, firmware or software at the programmable logic controller (PLC) level.

Human errors leading to violation of the security policy and/or easing the aforementioned malicious acts are also in the scope of this document.

This document describes a graded approach scheme for assets subject to digital compromise, based on their relevance to the overall plant safety, availability, and equipment protection.

Excluded from the scope of this document are considerations related to:

- non-malevolent actions and events such as accidental failures, human errors (except those impacting the performance of cybersecurity controls) and natural events. In particular, good practices for managing applications and data, including back-up and restoration related to accidental failure, are out of scope;

  NOTE 1 Although such aspects are often covered by security programme in other normative contexts (e.g., in the ISO/IEC 27000 series or in the IEC 62443 series), this document is only focused on the protection against malicious acts by digital means (cyberattacks) on I&C programmable digital systems. The main reason is that in the nuclear generation domain, other standards and practices already cover accidental failures, unintentional human errors, natural events, etc. The focus of IEC 62645 is made to provide the maximum consistency and the minimum overlap with these other nuclear standards and practices.

- site physical security, room access control and site security surveillance systems. These systems, while not specifically addressed in this document, are to be covered by plant operating procedures and programmes;

  NOTE 2 This exclusion does not deny that cybersecurity has clear dependencies on the security of the physical environment (e.g., physical protection, power delivery systems, heating/ventilation/air-conditioning systems (HVAC), etc.).

- the aspect of confidentiality of information about I&C digital programmable systems is out of the scope of this document (see 5.4.3.2.3).