
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Funktionssikkerhed – Sikkerhedssystemer til procesindustrien – Del 3: Vejledning til fastsættelse af påkrævede sikkerhedsintegritetsniveauer

Functional safety – Safety instrumented systems for the process industry sector – Part 3: Guidance for the determination of the required safety integrity levels



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(IEC 61511-3:2016)

Sécurité fonctionnelle - Systèmes instrumentés de sécurité pour le secteur des industries de transformation - Partie 3:

Conseils pour la détermination des niveaux exigés d'intégrité de sécurité (IEC 61511-3:2016)

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The following dates are fixed:

•	latest date by which the document has to be implemented at national level by publication of an identical national standard or by endorsement	(dop)	2017-10-21
•	latest date by which the national standards conflicting with the	(dow)	2020-04-21

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document have to be withdrawn

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IEC 61025:2006	NOTE	Harmonized as EN 61025:2007.
IEC 61165:2006	NOTE	Harmonized as EN 61165:2006.
IEC 61508-5:2010	NOTE	Harmonized as EN 61508-5:2010.
IEC 61508-6:2010	NOTE	Harmonized as EN 61508-6:2010.
IEC 62551:2012	NOTE	Harmonized as EN 62551:2012.
ISO/TR 12489:2013	NOTE	Harmonized as CEN ISO/TR 12489:2016.

Annex ZA

(normative)

Normative references to international publications with their corresponding European publications

The following documents, in whole or in part, are normatively referenced in this document and are indispensable for its application. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

NOTE 1 When an International Publication has been modified by common modifications, indicated by (mod), the relevant EN/HD applies.

NOTE 2 Up-to-date information on the latest versions of the European Standards listed in this annex is available here:

<u>Publication</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Title</u>	EN/HD	<u>Year</u>
IEC 61511-1	2016	Functional safety - Safety instrumented systems for the process industry sector -	EN 61511-1	2016
		systems for the process maustry sector -		
		Normative (uon) Part 1: Framework,		
		definitions, system, hardware and software	e	
		requirements		

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Edition 2.0 2016-07

INTERNATIONAL STANDARD

NORME INTERNATIONALE



Functional safety – Safety instrumented systems for the process industry sector –

Part 3: Guidance for the determination of the required safety integrity levels

Sécurité fonctionnelle – Systèmes instrumentés de sécurité pour le secteur des industries de transformation –

Partie 3: Conseils pour la détermination des niveaux exigés d'intégrité de sécurité



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INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION

FUNCTIONAL SAFETY – SAFETY INSTRUMENTED SYSTEMS FOR THE PROCESS INDUSTRY SECTOR –

Part 3: Guidance for the determination of the required safety integrity levels

FOREWORD

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International Standard IEC 61511-3: has been prepared by subcommittee 65A: System aspects, of IEC technical committee 65: Industrial-process measurement, control and automation.

This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition published in 2003. This edition constitutes a technical revision. This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:

Additional H&RA example(s) and quantitative analysis consideration annexes are provided.

The text of this document is based on the following documents:

FDIS	Report on voting
65A/779/FDIS	65A786/RVD

Full information on the voting for the approval of this standard can be found in the report on voting indicated in the above table.

This publication has been drafted in accordance with the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.

A list of all parts in the IEC 61511 series, published under the general title *Functional safety – Safety instrumented systems for the process industry sector*, can be found on the IEC website.

The committee has decided that the contents of this publication will remain unchanged until the stability date indicated on the IEC website under "http://webstore.iec.ch" in the data related to the specific publication. At this date, the publication will be

- · reconfirmed,
- · withdrawn,
- · replaced by a revised edition, or
- · amended.

IMPORTANT – The 'colour inside' logo on the cover page of this publication indicates that it contains colours which are considered to be useful for the correct understanding of its contents. Users should therefore print this document using a colour printer.

INTRODUCTION

Safety instrumented systems (SIS) have been used for many years to perform safety instrumented functions (SIF) in the process industries. If instrumentation is to be effectively used for SIF, it is essential that this instrumentation achieves certain minimum standards and performance levels.

The IEC 61511 series addresses the application of SIS for the process industries. A process hazard and risk assessment is carried out to enable the specification for SIS to be derived. Other safety systems are only considered so that their contribution can be taken into account when considering the performance requirements for the SIS. The SIS includes all devices and subsystems necessary to carry out the SIF from sensor(s) to final element(s).

The IEC 61511 series has two concepts which are fundamental to its application; SIS safety life-cycle and safety integrity levels (SIL).

The IEC 61511 series addresses SIS which are based on the use of Electrical (E)/Electronic (E)/Programmable Electronic (PE) technology. Where other technologies are used for logic solvers, the basic principles of the IEC 61511 series should be applied. The IEC 61511 series also addresses the SIS sensors and final elements regardless of the technology used. The IEC 61511 series is process industry specific within the framework of IEC 61508:2010.

The IEC 61511 series sets out an approach for SIS safety life-cycle activities to achieve these minimum standards. This approach has been adopted in order that a rational and consistent technical policy is used.

In most situations, safety is best achieved by an inherently safe process design. If necessary, this may be combined with a protective system or systems to address any residual identified risk. Protective systems can rely on different technologies (chemical, mechanical, hydraulic, pneumatic, electrical, electronic, and programmable electronic). Any safety strategy should consider each individual SIS in the context of the other protective systems. To facilitate this approach, the IEC 61511 series covers:

- a hazard and risk assessment is carried out to identify the overall safety requirements;
- an allocation of the safety requirements to the SIS is carried out;
- works within a framework which is applicable to all instrumented means of achieving functional safety;
- details the use of certain activities, such as safety management, which may be applicable to all methods of achieving functional safety;
- addressing all SIS safety life-cycle phases from initial concept, design, implementation, operation and maintenance through to decommissioning;
- enabling existing or new country specific process industry standards to be harmonized with the IEC 61511 series.

The IEC 61511 series is intended to lead to a high level of consistency (for example, of underlying principles, terminology, information) within the process industries. This should have both safety and economic benefits.

In jurisdictions where the governing authorities (for example national, federal, state, province, county, city) have established process safety design, process safety management, or other regulations, these take precedence over the requirements defined in the IEC 61511-1.

The IEC 61511-3 deals with guidance in the area of determining the required SIL in hazards and risk assessment. The information herein is intended to provide a broad overview of the wide range of global methods used to implement hazards and risk assessment. The information provided is not of sufficient detail to implement any of these approaches.

Before proceeding, the concept and determination of SIL provided in IEC 61511-1:2016should be reviewed. The informative annexes in the IEC 61511-3 address the following:

- Annex A provides information that is common to each of the hazard and risk assessment methods shown herein.
- Annex B provides an overview of a semi-quantitative method used to determine the required SIL.
- Annex C provides an overview of a safety matrix method to determine the required SIL.
- Annex D provides an overview of a method using a semi-qualitative risk graph approach to determine the required SIL.
- Annex E provides an overview of a method using a qualitative risk graph approach to determine the required SIL.
- Annex F provides an overview of a method using a layer of protection analysis (LOPA) approach to select the required SIL.
- Annex G provides a layer of protection analysis using a risk matrix.
- Annex H provides an overview of a qualitative approach for risk estimation & SIL assignment.
- Annex I provides an overview of the basic steps involved in designing and calibrating a risk graph.
- Annex J provides an overview of the impact of multiple safety systems on determining the required SIL
- Annex K provides an overview of the concepts of tolerable risk and ALARP.

Figure 1 shows the overall framework for IEC 61511-1, IEC 61511-2 and IEC 61511-3 and indicates the role that the IEC 61511 series plays in the achievement of functional safety for SIS.




Figure 1 - Overall framework of the IEC 61511 series

FUNCTIONAL SAFETY – SAFETY INSTRUMENTED SYSTEMS FOR THE PROCESS INDUSTRY SECTOR –

Part 3: Guidance for the determination of the required safety integrity levels

1 Scope

This part of IEC 61511 provides information on:

- the underlying concepts of risk and the relationship of risk to safety integrity (see Clause A.4);
- the determination of tolerable risk (see Annex K);
- a number of different methods that enable the safety integrity level (SIL) for the safety instrumented functions (SIF) to be determined (see Annexes B through K);
- the impact of multiple safety systems on calculations determining the ability to achieve the desired risk reduction (see Annex J).

In particular, this part of IEC 61511:

- a) applies when functional safety is achieved using one or more SIF for the protection of either personnel, the general public, or the environment;
- b) may be applied in non-safety applications such as asset protection;
- c) illustrates typical hazard and risk assessment methods that may be carried out to define the safety functional requirements and SIL of each SIF;
- d) illustrates techniques/measures available for determining the required SIL;
- e) provides a framework for establishing SIL but does not specify the SIL required for specific applications;
- f) does not give examples of determining the requirements for other methods of risk reduction.

NOTE Examples given in the Annexes of this Standard are intended only as case specific examples of implementing IEC 61511 requirements in a specific instance, and the user should satisfy themselves that the chosen methods and techniques are appropriate to their situation.

Annexes B through K illustrate quantitative and qualitative approaches and have been simplified in order to illustrate the underlying principles. These annexes have been included to illustrate the general principles of a number of methods but do not provide a definitive account.

- NOTE 1 Those intending to apply the methods indicated in these annexes can consult the source material referenced in each annex.
- NOTE 2 The methods of SIL determination included in Part 3 may not be suitable for all applications. In particular, specific techniques or additional factors that are not illustrated may be required for high demand or continuous mode of operation.
- NOTE 3 The methods as illustrated herein may result in non-conservative results when they are used beyond their underlying limits and when factors such as common cause, fault tolerance, holistic considerations of the application, lack of experience with the method being used, independence of the protection layers, etc., are not properly considered. See Annex J.

Figure 2 gives an overview of typical protection layers and risk reduction means.




Figure 2 – Typical protection layers and risk reduction means

2 Normative references

The following documents, in whole or in part, are normatively referenced in this document and are indispensable for its application. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

IEC 61511-1:2016 Functional safety – Safety instrumented systems for the process industry sector – Part 1: framework, definitions, system, hardware and application programming requirements

3 Terms, definitions and abbreviations

For the purposes of this document the terms, definitions, and abbreviations given in IEC 61511-1:2016apply.

The annexes in this Part 3 are informative and not normative. Also, the application of any particular method described in Part 3 annexes does not guarantee compliance with the requirements of IEC 61511-1:2016.