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# TECHNICAL REPORT



Power systems management and associated information exchange – Data and communications security – Part 10: Security architecture guidelines

INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION

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## INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION

# POWER SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT AND ASSOCIATED INFORMATION EXCHANGE – DATA AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY –

### Part 10: Security architecture guidelines

#### FOREWORD

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IEC 62351-10, which is a technical report, has been prepared by IEC technical committee 57: Power systems management and associated information exchange.

The text of this technical report is based on the following documents:

Enquiry draft	Report on voting
57/1234/DTR	57/1265/RVC

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Full information on the voting for the approval of this technical report can be found in the report on voting indicated in the above table.

This publication has been drafted in accordance with the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.

A list of all parts in the IEC 62351 series, published under the general title *Power systems* management and associated information exchange – Data and communications security, can be found on the IEC website.

The committee has decided that the contents of this publication will remain unchanged until the stability date indicated on the IEC web site under "http://webstore.iec.ch" in the data related to the specific publication. At this date, the publication will be

- reconfirmed,
- withdrawn,
- replaced by a revised edition, or
- amended.

A bilingual version of this publication may be issued at a later date.

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# INTRODUCTION

Cyber security becomes more and more a basic necessity in power control systems as standard IT and other forms of modern communication technology are being increasingly used for control and supervision of these systems. The application of IT communication technology demands the consideration of already existing vulnerabilities, which can be exploited by potential attackers, as recent intentional and unintentional cyber incidents on SCADA and other industrial control systems have shown. The increasing number of control system cyber incidents world-wide with medium to high impact underlines the importance of appropriate security measures (see [11]<sup>1</sup>).

The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) Technical Committee (TC) 57 (Power Systems Management and Associated Information Exchange) is responsible for developing international standards for power system data communications protocols. Standards developed within TC 57 comprise for instance IEC 60870-5, IEC 61850, and IEC 62351 just to state a few. Especially the latter addresses technical security controls within power systems.

A security architecture as targeted here does not only comprise technical means like the application of dedicated security entities, security protocols or security options in communication protocols to secure power system entities or the communication network. It also describes operational guidelines considering the available technical base as well as the personnel controlling the power systems. Moreover, interactions with existing (security) infrastructures also affect overall system security.

In this Technical Report hands-on guidelines are proposed for the implementation of security mechanisms based on deployment examples, rather than a lecture or reference book for security in general. Therefore, available resources of information related to security of power systems or more general to security in Smart Grid are utilized and will be referenced as much as possible, without repeating their content here. Thus this Technical Report addresses both, the power system engineer and the traditional IT security engineer.

The examples used throughout this Technical Report are intended to better explain the influences of and the interactions with security. They are used as descriptive examples without the claim to be complete.

Clause 4 of this Technical Report specifies the specifics of the power systems industry, comprising differences in the security requirements compared to office systems as well as an overview about related standardization. It also introduces the TC 57 reference architecture as one base for the security architecture discussion.

Clause 5 establishes a general approach to a security architecture by using security domains and dedicated security controls within these domains and maps this approach to the power system domain based on examples use cases. Clause 5 also addresses the mapping of the NIST identified interface categories with the TC 57 architecture interfaces.

Clause 6 maps security controls with the IEC TC 57 power system architecture based on example scenarios. It starts with an overview scenario of power systems and digs into dedicated sub-scenarios like a substation deployment, the communication between a substation and a control centre and so on.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> References in square brackets refer to the Bibliography.

# POWER SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT AND ASSOCIATED INFORMATION EXCHANGE – DATA AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY –

#### Part 10: Security architecture guidelines

#### 1 Scope

This part of IEC 62351, which is a Technical Report, targets the description of security architecture guidelines for power systems based on essential security controls, i.e. on security-related components and functions and their interaction. Furthermore, the relation and mapping of these security controls to the general system architecture of power systems is provided as a guideline to support system integrators to securely deploy power generation, transmission, and distribution systems applying available standards.

#### 2 Normative references

The following documents, in whole or in part, are normatively referenced in this document and are indispensable for its application. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

IEC/TS 62351-2, Power systems management and associated information exchange – Data and communications security – Part 2: Glossary of terms