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# TECHNICAL REPORT

OPC Unified Architecture – Part 2: Security Model

INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION

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#### INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION

## **OPC UNIFIED ARCHITECTURE -**

Part 2: Security Model

#### **FOREWORD**

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IEC 62541-2, which is a technical report, has been prepared by subcommittee 65E: Devices and integration in enterprise systems, of IEC technical committee 65: Industrial-process measurement, control and automation.

The text of this technical report is based on the following documents:

Enquiry draft	Report on voting
65E/93/DTR	65E/155/RVC

Full information on the voting for the approval of this standard can be found in the report on voting indicated in the above table.

This publication has been drafted in accordance with the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.

A list of all parts of the IEC 62541 series, under the general title *OPC Unified Architecture*, can be found on the IEC website.

The committee has decided that the contents of this publication will remain unchanged until the stability date indicated on the IEC web site under "http://webstore.iec.ch" in the data related to the specific publication. At this date, the publication will be

- · reconfirmed,
- · withdrawn,
- · replaced by a revised edition, or
- · amended.

A bilingual version of this publication may be issued at a later date.

# INTRODUCTION

This technical report introduces security concepts for OPC Unified Architecture as specified by IEC 62541. This technical report and specification are a result of an analysis and design process to develop a standard interface to facilitate the development of applications by multiple vendors that inter-operate seamlessly together.

## OPC UNIFIED ARCHITECTURE -

# Part 2: Security Model

#### 1 Scope

This part of IEC 62541 describes the OPC Unified Architecture (OPC UA) security model. It describes the security threats of the physical, hardware and software environments in which OPC UA is expected to run. It describes how OPC UA relies upon other standards for security. It gives an overview of the security features that are specified in other parts of the OPC UA specification. It references services, mappings, and profiles that are specified normatively in other parts of this series of standards.

Note that there are many different aspects of security that have to be addressed when developing applications. However since OPC UA specifies a communication protocol, the focus is on securing the data exchanged between applications.

This does not mean that an application developer can ignore the other aspects of security like protecting persistent data against tampering. It is important that the developer look into all aspects of security and decide how they can be addressed in the application.

This part of IEC 62541 is directed to readers who will develop OPC UA client or server applications or implement the OPC UA services layer.

It is assumed that the reader is familiar with Web Services and XML/SOAP. Information on these technologies can be found in SOAP Part 1 and SOAP Part 2.

#### 2 Normative references

The following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

IEC 62541 (all parts), OPC Unified Architecture

IEC 62541-1, OPC Unified Architecture – Part 1: Overview and concepts

## 3 Terms, definitions, abbreviations and conventions

#### 3.1 Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this document the following terms and definitions as well as the terms and definitions given in IEC 62541-1 apply.

#### 3.1.1

# **Application Instance**

individual installation of a program running on one computer

NOTE There can be several *Application Instances* of the same application running at the same time on several computers or possibly the same computer.