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INCITS/ISO/IEC 18045-2008  
(ISO/IEC 18045:2008, IDT)

# American National Standard

*Information technology —  
Security techniques — Methodology  
for IT security evaluation*

**Developed by**



*Where IT all begins*



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techniques — Methodology for IT security  
evaluation**

*Technologies de l'information — Techniques de sécurité —  
Méthodologie pour l'évaluation de sécurité TI*

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Tel. + 41 22 749 01 11  
Fax + 41 22 749 09 47  
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## Foreword

ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) and IEC (the International Electrotechnical Commission) form the specialized system for worldwide standardization. National bodies that are members of ISO or IEC participate in the development of International Standards through technical committees established by the respective organization to deal with particular fields of technical activity. ISO and IEC technical committees collaborate in fields of mutual interest. Other international organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO and IEC, also take part in the work. In the field of information technology, ISO and IEC have established a joint technical committee, ISO/IEC JTC 1.

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The main task of the joint technical committee is to prepare International Standards. Draft International Standards adopted by the joint technical committee are circulated to national bodies for voting. Publication as an International Standard requires approval by at least 75 % of the national bodies casting a vote.

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ISO/IEC 18045 was prepared by Joint Technical Committee ISO/IEC JTC 1, *Information technology*, Subcommittee SC 27, *IT Security techniques*. The identical text of ISO/IEC 18045 is published by the Common Criteria Project Sponsoring Organisations as *Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation*. The common XML source for both publications can be found at <http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/>.

This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition (ISO/IEC 18045:2005), which has been technically revised.

This second corrected version of ISO/IEC 18045:2008 incorporates miscellaneous editorial corrections related to the following:

- consistency with the corrected versions of ISO/IEC 15408-3:2008 and ISO/IEC 15408-1:2009;
- APE\_CCL and ASE\_CCL, APE\_SPD and ASE\_SPD, AGD\_PRE, ALC\_CMC, ALC\_DVS, ADV\_TDS, ASE\_TSS, AVA\_VAN, and ADV\_FSP.

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## Introduction

The target audience for this International Standard is primarily evaluators applying ISO/IEC 15408 and certifiers confirming evaluator actions; evaluation sponsors, developers, PP/ST authors and other parties interested in IT security may be a secondary audience.

This International Standard recognises that not all questions concerning IT security evaluation will be answered herein and that further interpretations will be needed. Individual schemes will determine how to handle such interpretations, although these may be subject to mutual recognition agreements. A list of methodology-related activities that may be handled by individual schemes can be found in Annex A.