

ISO/IEC 15408-2

Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection — Evaluation criteria for IT security —

Part 2: Security functional components

*Sécurité de l'information, cybersécurité et protection de la vie
privée — Critères d'évaluation pour la sécurité des technologies
de l'information —*

Partie 2: Composants fonctionnels de sécurité

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This fifth edition cancels and replaces the fourth edition (ISO/IEC 15408-2:2022), which has been technically revised.

The main changes are as follows:

- the document has been restructured;
- technical changes have been introduced:
 - the terminology has been reviewed and updated;
 - the dependency and hierarchy for each component have been reviewed and updated;
 - the new notes for operations have been introduced.

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Security functional components, as defined in this document, are the basis for the security functional requirements (SFRs) or components expressed in a Protection Profile (PP), PP-Module, functional package or a Security Target (ST). These requirements describe the desired security behaviour expected of a Target of Evaluation (TOE) and are intended to meet the security objectives as stated in a PP, PP-Module, functional package or an ST. These requirements describe security properties that users can detect by direct interaction (i.e. inputs, outputs) with the Information Technology (IT) or by the IT response to stimulus.

Security functional components allow for the expression of SFRs intended to counter threats in the assumed operating environment of the TOE and cover any identified organizational security policies.

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- consumers, who use this document when selecting components to express functional requirements which satisfy the security objectives expressed in a PP, PP-Module, functional package or ST. ISO/IEC 15408-1 provides more detailed information on the relationship between security objectives and security requirements;
- developers, who respond to actual or perceived consumer security requirements in constructing a TOE and will find a standardized method to understand those requirements in this document. They also use the contents of this document as a basis for further defining the TOE security functionality and mechanisms that conform with those requirements;
- evaluators, who use the SFRs defined in this document in verifying that the TOE functional requirements expressed in the PP, PP-Module, functional package or ST satisfy the IT security objectives and that all dependencies are accounted for and shown to be satisfied. Evaluators use this document to assist in determining whether a given TOE satisfies stated requirements.

This document uses bold type to highlight hierarchical relationships between requirements. This convention calls for the use of bold type for all new requirements.

For security functional requirements, the use of italics denotes assignment and selection items.

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