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# IT Security techniques — Test tool requirements and test tool calibration methods for use in testing non-invasive attack mitigation techniques in cryptographic modules —

## Part 2: Test calibration methods and apparatus

*Techniques de sécurité IT — Exigences de l'outil de test et méthodes d'étalonnage de l'outil de test utilisées pour tester les techniques d'atténuation des attaques non invasives dans les modules cryptographiques —*

*Partie 2: Méthodes et appareillage d'étalonnage et d'essai*



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## Foreword

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## Introduction

Cryptographic modules provide cryptographic services and protect critical security parameters. Protection of critical security parameters can either be logical, physical, or both. Information such as knowledge of critical security parameters can leak out of the cryptographic module during operation, if the module is not designed to mitigate such leakage. Without mitigation, a malevolent attacker can record available side-channel leakage. This leakage is a physical quantity related to the critical security parameters and can be analysed in a manner to extract information about those parameters. Such analysis is passive, in that it simply collects the side-channel leakage measurements which can be freely acquired with an apparatus. Notice that the measurement tool can, as well, be adaptively controlled. This kind of extraction and analysis is referred to as non-invasive. Techniques that allow the extraction of critical security parameters out of this non-invasive leakage is termed an *attack* on the module.

Non-invasive attack testing is a method to determine whether the leakage of a cryptographic module can be exploited to extract critical security parameters. A non-invasive attack test tool returns a pass status if the cryptographic module leakage is determined to be of a minimal amount which may prevent disclosure of critical security parameters. Otherwise, it returns a fail status.

This document focuses on the calibration of the side-channel measurement tool. This calibration process enables two measurement tools to record measurements equally usable in terms of side channel analysis. Calibration is presented as the combination of two techniques:

- a) definition of a method for calibration;
- b) requirement of a reference cryptographic module (called an artefact) to define a clear threshold between test results, in terms of fail or pass.

Both aspects are covered in this document.