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Information technology — Security techniques — Digital signature schemes giving message recovery —

Part 3: Discrete logarithm based mechanisms

Technologies de l'information — Techniques des sécurité — Schémas de signature numérique rétablissant le message —

Partie 3: Mécanismes basés sur les logarithmes discrets

Reference number
ISO/IEC 9796-3:2006(E)



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Foreword

ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) and IEC (the International Electrotechnical Commission) form the specialized system for worldwide standardization. National bodies that are members of ISO or IEC participate in the development of International Standards through technical committees established by the respective organization to deal with particular fields of technical activity. ISO and IEC technical committees collaborate in fields of mutual interest. Other international organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO and IEC, also take part in the work. In the field of information technology, ISO and IEC have established a joint technical committee, ISO/IEC JTC 1.

International Standards are drafted in accordance with the rules given in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.

The main task of the joint technical committee is to prepare International Standards. Draft International Standards adopted by the joint technical committee are circulated to national bodies for voting. Publication as an International Standard requires approval by at least 75 % of the national bodies casting a vote.

ISO/IEC 9796-3 was prepared by Joint Technical Committee ISO/IEC /JTC 1, *Information technology*, Subcommittee SC 27, *IT Security techniques*.

This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition (ISO/IEC 9796-3:2000), which has been technically revised. New mechanisms and object identifiers have been specified.

ISO/IEC 9796 consists of the following parts, under the general title *Information technology — Security techniques — Digital signature schemes giving message recovery*:

- *Part 2: Integer factorization based mechanisms*
- *Part 3: Discrete logarithm based mechanisms*

This corrected version of ISO/IEC 9796-3:2006 incorporates the following corrections:

- The year of publication has been removed from references to ISO/IEC 15946-1.
- The last paragraph of 6.2.1 has been modified and ISO/IEC 15946-5 has been added to Clause 2.

Introduction

Digital signature mechanisms can be used to provide services such as entity authentication, data origin authentication, non-repudiation, and integrity of data.

A digital signature mechanism satisfies the following requirements:

- given only the public verification key and not the private signature key, it is computationally infeasible to produce a valid signature for any given message;
- the signatures produced by a signer can neither be used for producing a valid signature for any new message nor for recovering the signature key;
- it is computationally infeasible, even for the signer, to find two different messages with the same signature.

Most digital signature mechanisms are based on asymmetric cryptographic techniques and involve three basic operations:

- a process for generating pairs of keys, where each pair consists of a private signature key and the corresponding public verification key;
- a process using the private signature key, called the **signature generation process**;
- a process using the public verification key, called the **signature verification process**.

There are two types of digital signature mechanisms:

- when, for each given private signature key, the signatures produced for the same message are the same, the mechanism is said to be **non-randomized** (or **deterministic**) [see ISO/IEC 14888-1];
- when, for a given message and a given private signature key, each application of the signature process produces a different signature, the mechanism is said to be **randomized**.

This part of ISO/IEC 9796 specifies randomized mechanisms.

Digital signature schemes can also be divided into the following two categories:

- when the whole message has to be stored and/or transmitted along with the signature, the mechanism is named a **signature mechanism with appendix** [see ISO/IEC 14888];
- when the whole message or a part of it is recovered from the signature, the mechanism is named a **signature mechanism giving message recovery**.

If the message is short enough, then the entire message can be included in the signature, and recovered from the signature in the signature verification process. Otherwise, a part of the message can be included in the signature and the rest of it is stored and/or transmitted along with the signature. The mechanisms specified in ISO/IEC 9796 give either total or partial recovery, aiming at reducing storage and transmission overhead.

This part of ISO/IEC 9796 includes six mechanisms, one of which was in ISO/IEC 9796-3:2000 and five of which are in ISO/IEC 15946-4:2004. The mechanisms specified in this part of ISO/IEC 9796 use a hash-function to hash the entire message. ISO/IEC 10118 specifies hash-functions. Some of the mechanisms specified in this part of ISO/IEC 9796 use a group on an elliptic curve over finite field. ISO/IEC 15946-1 describes the mathematical background and general techniques necessary for implementing cryptosystems based on elliptic curves defined over finite fields.

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The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) draw attention to the fact that it is claimed that compliance with this document may involve the use of patents concerning the mechanisms NR, ECMR and ECAO given in Clause 8, 10 and 11, respectively.

| Area | Patent no. | Issue date | Inventors |
|----------------------|---------------------------------------|------------|-----------------------------|
| NR [see Clause 8] | US 5 600 725, EP 0 639 907 | 1997-02-04 | K. Nyberg and R. A. Rueppel |
| ECMR [see Clause 10] | JP H09-160492 (patent application) | | A. Miyaji |
| ECAO [see Clause 11] | JP 3 434 251 | 2003-08-04 | M. Abe and T. Okamoto |

ISO and IEC take no position concerning the evidence, validity and scope of these patent rights.

The holders of these patent rights have assured the ISO and IEC that they are willing to negotiate licences under reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions with applicants throughout the world. In this respect, the statement of the holders of these patent rights are registered with ISO and IEC. Information may be obtained from the following companies.

| Patent no. | Name of holder of patent right | Contact address |
|-------------------------------|--|--|
| US 5 600 725, EP 0 639 907 | Certicom Corp. | 5520 Explorer Drive, 4th Floor, Mississauga, Ontario, Canada L4W 5L1 |
| JP H09-160492 | Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. | Matsushita IMP Building 19 th Floor, 1-3-7, Siromi, Chuo-ku, Osaka 540-6319, Japan |
| JP 3 434 251 | NTT Intellectual Property Center | 9-11 Midori-Cho 3-chome, Musashino-shi, Tokyo 180-8585, Japan |

Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent rights other than those identified above. ISO and IEC shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.

NOTE 1 Computational feasibility depends on the specific security requirements and environment.

NOTE 2 Any signature mechanism giving message recovery — for example, the mechanisms specified in this part of ISO/IEC 9796 — can be converted for provision of digital signatures with appendix. In this case, the signature is produced by application of the signature mechanism to a hash-token of the message.